The Truth about Afghanistan, and its meaning for US policy

The obvious truth about Afghanistan is that there are two conditions for an American victory, assuming victory means building a democratic republic in the territory we call Afghanistan. One has to do with the number of troops. The other is the length of the commitment: how long will we stay?

Obama’s policy meets neither condition. It will not establish a democratic republic, and it is unlikely to bring about any real consolidation of power centered in Kabul. Afghanistan is not a nation, and sending in 80% of the troops needed for period of eighteen months is not going to turn it into one. The King of Afghanistan was always no more than the Grand Duke of Kabul, a Khan of Khans but not Great Khan; the local Khans were not his subordinates and did not attend at his court. That has not changed. The President of Afghanistan is the Mayor of Kabul, and he has even less authority over the village and territorial Khans than the King ever did. You may prefer to call the local Khans “tribal leaders” or “Warlords”; the nomenclature isn’t important.

The Russians drove much of the local infrastructure into the hills, and the Taliban — many of them mujahadeen armed and subsidized by US and Pakistani intelligence agents — were poised to take over when the Russians gave up the effort to establish a soviet republic government centered in Kabul in the territory called Afghanistan. Note that whatever criticisms one might have of the Soviet strategy, squeamishness was not one of them. They were ruthless in meeting terror with counter-terror, going so far as to leave booby trapped teddy bears and other toys where children could find them; there were other tactics consistent with that. If ruthless counter-terrorism would serve, the Soviets would not have abandoned Afghanistan.

The Russians drove the Khans into the hills, and the Taliban took advantage of that. They came as liberators, and they imposed a central government on Afghanistan, the first in well over a century. Their control appeared absolute, but proved to be fragile: with the help of some US Special Forces the Northern Alliance — Warlords and Khans — returned to control of the cities, towns, and villages. The Taliban leaders retreated to the hills, and to Pakistan, and another round in the perpetual conflict in Afghanistan began. Today the Taliban has made it dangerous to be seen as a friend of the West. They have also shown that they have long memories.

Counterinsurgency strategy relies on this proposition: friends of the West prosper without having to submit and kowtow. Become a friend of the west and you will have schools and fresh water, and we will help you keep your markets safe. The Taliban strategy is simply to remind the local Khans that the Taliban do not forget. The friends of our enemies are enemies, and our memories are long.

How long? We don’t know, but at least a generation. Fifteen years? Certainly no fewer than ten. And absolutely longer than five years, much less eighteen months.

Obama’s strategy cannot succeed in building a new order in Afghanistan. However desirable it may be to have a democratic republic in Afghanistan, this strategy cannot achieve it. In order to achieve that goal we must commit more troops now — and more importantly, commit to stay as long as necessary.

It has always been clear that we never intended to make such a commitment. One need only look at Viet Nam. In Viet Nam the local pacification had already been achieved. The Vietnamization of the war was a success. The only threat to South Viet Nam after 1970 was massive invasion from the north — and that couldn’t succeed so long as the United States was willing to support the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam with materiel and air support. That was proved in 1972 when 150,000 North Vietnamese regulars. twelve (12) Divisions, rolled south with as much armor as Guderian had in the conquest of France. The US provided support, but the war was won by ARVN. US casualties for 1972 were 640, with an additional 168 in 1973. Despite this, the Congress of the United States ended our commitment to Viet Nam, and the next invasion from the North was successful: Congress voted no air support, and materiel support of 20 cartridges and 2 hand grenades per ARVN soldier. The invading army was fully supplied.

Note that the threat to Viet Nam wasn’t “insurgency”, and the US didn’t need to leave much in the way of troops; what troops we had left on the ground were in enclaves (a strategy first proposed by Gen. James Gavin) in 1965. Viet Nam did not fall to insurgents or guerrillas. It fell to an armored army invading from the north. But mostly it fell to a withdrawal of support by the United States, even though that support did not require massive troop deployment or counter insurgency tactics. That commitment did not require much exposure of US troops to danger from infiltrators, and the 1972 war showed that US casualties would be small even in the event of an all-out invasion. If the US wouldn’t meet that commitment, then it was extremely unlikely that the US would commit to keep the Legions in Afghanistan, where conditions were worse and we had far less at stake.

Note also that we have no real national interest in Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq there is no oil, there is no warm water port upon the sea, there is nothing made or grown there that we need, there are no trade routes vital to western commerce. The only strategic importance of the area is its ability to harbor our enemies.

A Different Objective?

If the American objective is changed from “establish a democratic republic friendly to the west” to “make sure no US enemies are harbored in Afghanistan,” will the new Obama strategy accomplish that?

It seems unlikely, but that needs more analysis. We’ll get to that another day. But last night Obama announced, clearly, that the West will not stay in Afghanistan; Afghanistan will not be restructured; the President of Afghanistan will remain the Mayor of Kabul; and the Taliban need only wait. And the local Khans will understand that the Taliban forgets nothing.